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Anticipating Trade Policy in 1987
-y 'lJohn II. Jackson
his will be a
pivotal year for
world trade pol-
icy. A new Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade round of trade negotia-
tions (the eighth) was launched
in Punta del Este in September
1986. The approaching entry
of China into the GATT will
pose formidable problems.
Dramatic short-term shifts in
exchange rates and Third
World debt questions are inti-
mately linked to trade. There is
increasing worry that the cur-
rent world trading institutions,
particularly the GATT, are in-
adequate to cope with the
strains of the world's growing
economic interdependence.
Finally, U.S. congressional lead-
ers have promised that in 1987
Congress will pursue important
trade legislation.
The new negotiation will un-
doubtedly be the last such
GATT endeavor for this cen-
tury. The incredibly broad
scope of this negotiation and
the number of new perplexing
issues demanding a place on its
agenda (such as trade in ser-
vices) make it likely that the
results will establish the land-
scape for trade and interna-
tional economic policies well
into the 21st century. Conse-
quently, activities in 1987 in
the United States as well as
other countries can have an
unusually profound effect.
Central to any discussion of
trade policy today is the GATT.
Although it is the key interna-
tional institution for trade, the
GATT was never intended to
be such. After the 1944 Bretton
Woods Conference, attention
shifted to the need for institu-
tions regarding trade. In a dis-
couraging story, from 1946 to
1948 the postwar Western de-
mocracies struggled to create
an International Trade Organi-
zation, only to see their effort
scuttled by the U.S. Congress.
Left on the scene was an agree-
ment never meant to be an or-
ganization and substantially
lacking the useful constitutional
and structural clauses found in
the charters of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank. The GATT has
had to "fill the gap." Indeed,
the GATT, as such, has never
come into force; it is still ap-
plied by the "Protocol of Pro-
visional Application!"
Despite all this, the GATT has served the world
far better than that world has had a right to expect.
Major trade liberalization has occurred during those
four decades, and most of that period has been ac-
companied by great and rising prosperity; not
without stress, however. The problems of trade in
the context of issues that the GATT was designed
to address have become increasingly difficult, aid-
ed by the extraordinary advance of world economic
interdependence. This in turn can be causally linked
not only to the mind-boggling technological im-
provements in communication, transport and
marketing, but also to the very success of GATT
trade liberalization.
Added to the complex traditional problems of
trade policy are a series of new issues, rarely or never
contemplated by GATT's midwives: trade in ser-
vices; greater government ownership in economies;
nonmarket economies; high technology products
with short life cycles and production techniques that
raise questions about the continued applicability of
traditional economic doctrines of comparative ad-
vantage; and of course the trauma of underdevel-
oped countries and their debt service dilemmas. Can
the GATT cope? Serious doubts are tempered only
by the record of a GATT coping more successfully
than anticipated in the first place.
THE PROBLEMS OF GATT
There are indeed many problems with the GATT.
To begin with, for all practical purposes the GATT
cannot be amended. Thus, during the Tokyo Round
a series of "side agreements" or "codes" were
negotiated with the objectives of clarifying and ex-
tending international rule discipline to diverse sub-
jects such as customs valuation, antidumping and
countervailing duties, government procurement, and
product standardization. Many new problems arise,
however, with a side-agreement approach.
Furthermore, much concern exists about whether
the various rules are working. One of the major ways
by which an international system tries to promote
rule integrity is through a respected and efficient
dispute settlement procedure. Such a procedure for
GATT and comparable procedures for various codes
have been in the spotlight in recent years, with many
thoughtful leaders suggesting that these procedures
are serously flawed.
As more countries have entered the GATT, the
question of voting and decisionmaking processes has
begun to cast a longer shadow over what started as
a cozy club of 22 like-minded nations. Consensus
decisionmaking, touted by many national diplomats,
has certain concomitant defects: it yields effective
veto power to one or a few countries; tends to re-
duce initiatives to a lowest common denominator;
and encourages bilateral or pluralateral initiatives by
self-selected groups of countries who may or may
not adequately take into account the multifarious in-
terests of nations left outside the negotiating rooms
of power.
Certain basic principles of the GATT, most nota-
bly the most-favored-nation (MFN) clause or princi-
ple of international nondiscrimination as well as the
rule prohibiting quantitative restrictions (whether ar-
ranged by importing or exporting countries), have
.been increasingly challenged or ignored.
ORIGINS OF THE
TRADING SYSTEM
The current international trading system can be
viewed as part of a broader international economic
system sometimes characterized as Bretton Woods.
This system includes international monetary institu-
tions (such as the IMF, developed at the 1944 con-
ference), investment (e.g., the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development), trade
(the GATT), and various other institutions. It also in-
volves interlinking national laws and processes. The
whole system is a complex web of hundreds of
treaties, thQusands of national laws, dozens of
government agencies in each of over 100 countries,
and a vast array of private and enterprise interest
groups.
The origins of the trading system, and particular-
ly the GATT, can be traced back for centuries into
bilateral friendship, commerce and navigation (FCN)
treaties, MFN clauses, League of Nations activities,
and national legislation such as the U.S. 1897 coun-
tervailing duty law.
The modern origins, however, can most plausibly
be traced to the 1934 U.S. Reciprocal Trade Agree-
ments Act, in turn part of the troublesome landscape
furnished to trade policy by the U.S. Constitution.
A "perpetual war between the branches" is struc-
tured within the Constitution, and this constant
struggle has additional dimensions of perplexity for
international trade subjects. Although these areas are
part of "foreign affairs" and therefore might partake
of the traditional deference that courts and the elec-
torate seem to grant to the President. trade is dif-
ferent: the Constitution explicitly allocates power to
Congress in "interstate and foreign commerce."
Congressional committees and leaders rarely pass up
an opportunity to remind the public and the execu-
tive branch of this basis for Congress's special role
of power over trade matters.
The 193,1 act was an important milestone in the
history of this problem. The thrust of the act was
the delegation by Congress to the President of im-
portant powers over U.S. tariff setting, partly as an
antidote to the damage caused by the 1930 Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act. Debate on the floor of Congress
recognized the "discouraging" experience of Con-
gress "in writing tariff legislation. . . ..As one
senator stated in that debate: ". . . Log-rolling is in-
evitable, and in its most pernicious form. We do not
write a national tariff law. We jam together, through
various unholy alliances and combinations, a pot-
pourri or hodgepodge of section and local tariff rates,
which often add to our troubles and increase world
misery..." (78 Cong. Rec. 10379).
Thus the 1934 act represented an important
change in the pragmatic allocation of power-a
change, however, that was not perpetual and that
troubles members of Congress to this day. The 1934
act has been renewed many times and is still the
centerpiece for thinking about U.S. trade legislation.
(In fact, the GATT was accepted for the United States
by the President without referral to Congress, under
the authority of the 1945 renewal of this act.) Yet,
since the 1962 renewal expired in 1967, Congress
has become increasingly grudging in renewing or ex-
tending powers over international trade to the Presi-
dent. The traditional reciprocal trade agreements
tariff authority lapsed from 1967 to 1975 and has
again lapsed since 1980. The shock to thinking about
the allocation of power to the President caused by
both the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal has
had its effect on trade. Alternative statutory phrase-
ology, necessitated by the shift of concern from
tariffs to nontariff barriers (NTBs), has been similar-
lv circumscribed, as we note below. In short, Con-
gress has become increasingly stingy in following the
precedent set in the 1934 act, and therein lies a major
difficulty of U.S. implementation of trade policy.
he so-called fast track (clearly a central issue
of any 1987 legislative scenario) is part of
this picture. When international negotiations shifted
focus to nontariff measures. the question of how the
U.S. executive branch could effectively negotiate
rules about NTBs was raised by those foreign govern-
ments disappointed by Congress's multiple rejec-
tions of the results of the GATT negotiations that had
to be submitted to Congress. Jealous of its power,
Congress has not been inclined to give advance dele-
gations to the executive branch on the many com-
plex and politically supercharged issues involved in
nontariff measures. In the formulation of the 1974
Trade Act, a mechanism was worked out that would
give U.S. negotiators sufficient "credibility" so that
foreign governments would be willing to negotiate
with them, while preserving ultimate approval
authority for Congress. Thus was born the fast track
provisions of the 1974 act: Congress was consulted
extensively during the negotiation, but at the end
the executive could submit a single bill to Congress
for approval of the agreements negotiated and im-
plementation of their rules into domestic law. Under
fast track procedures, this bill could not be amend-
ed, had to be reported out of committee within
fixed time limits, and was subject to time-limited
debates in the Senate and the House. The procedure
worked splendidly in 1979 when the Tokyo Round
results were approved by votes of 90 to 4 and 395
to 7.
This procedure, like elements of the original
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, is not perpetual.
The current principal version found in Section 102
of the 1974 act will expire in January 1988. A major
question for 1987 and Congress is whether the pro-
cedure should be renewed, and when. An important
subsidiary question is whether the executive branch
feels it needs this procedure or can get along without
it. Legally, of course, the President can negotiate to
his heart's content. But to accept the negotiation
results or to implement them, he will have to have
congressional participation in some form. Can the
President risk launching into a major trade negotia-
tion without at least a significant congressional pat
on the back? Can he risk proceeding and only later
ask Congress to reenact the fast track procedure, or
even wait until the end of the negotiation (likely to
occur in another Administration) and then submit
the results for congressional approval? Obviously
these are momentous and delicate judgments. dif-
ficult to appraise with accuracy. However,'historyv
suggests much danger in waiting.
"UNFAIR" TRADE PRACTICES
Since the sixth GATT round (the Kennedy Round,
1962-67), the focus of national trade policy leaders
has turned from tariffs to nontariff barriers. NTBs
have become the principal impediments to the rela-
tively free flow of trade in today's world, and it has
been recognized that the only sensible way'to reduce
this plethora of impediments is to establish interna-
tional disciplines derived through careful consulta-
tion by concerned nations. Thus the seventh round
(the Tokyo Round, 1973-79) devoted the bulk of its
attention to NTBs, establishing the series of codes
about many of them.
In the concern over trade impediments other than
tariffs, there have been many statements by
numerous political leaders who claim to avoid "pro-
tectionism" but condemn "unfair trade practices"
and urge the need for a "level playing field." In some
ways such attitudes are very constructive. Attention
is certainly needed to these concepts. International
and national agencies have inventoried thousands of
specific instances of national government or private
firm practices of nontariff measures inhibiting trade
that damage the basic policies of comparative advan-
tage and liberal trade. Some of those measures are
blatantly protectionist. Others, however, raise dif-
ficult issues of balancing opposing legitimate govern-
mental goals. It is the latter issues that are beginning
to cause great concern about the trends of trade
policy and government action as well as the ability
of GATT and its related codes to adequately cope.
Congressional efforts (unfortunately without
much leadership from the executive branch) that
resulted in the adopted trade legislation of 198-i and
the attempted legislation of 1986 contain some
laudable proposals. However, many other provisions
misconstrue the problems that exist and could cause
considerable damage to the trading system. In many
cases the provisions and proposals manifest an in-
tensity of feeling about the power struggle between
Congress and the executive that overshadows and
sometimes submerges the real issues. Indeed. the
1986 bill (H.R. 4800) could in some ways be called
the new version of the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff
Act, not because it is a single-minded effort to pre-
vent import competition, but because, as the Senator
said in 1934, the bill represents a "jam[ming] to-
gether ... a hodgepodge" of various constituent in-
terests. A number of proposals in the 1986 bill are
designed to overturn actions by administrative agen-
cies or the courts. Those actions were taken in good
faith that they best carried out the legitimate policies
of the law while balancing with fairness various
countervailing policy considerations of vital concern
to alternative constituencies, including those in
foreign countries.
The fact remains that there is inadequate national
or international agreement about what is "unfair"
in trade practices today. There is also evidence that
attempts to restrain imports on the ground of unfair
practices are sometimes manipulated by special in-
terests with the primary goal of reducing competi-
tion in the U.S. market. For these and other reasons,
today we have to be cautious in interpreting the term
unfair when applied to trade. It is easy to be against
unfair trade; it is often extremely difficult to define
appropriately what is unfair, as the following ex-
amples demonstrate.
any statements are made condemning
dumping, although some economists and
others dispute whether dumping, meaning price
discrimination, has bad economic effects. It is asked
why, when the government is not enforcing the
domestic price discrimination statute (the Robinson-
Patman Act), should the government take a different
approach when goods come from outside the
border. Apart from that, even if we believe that
government should act to offset a lower price on im-
ported goods compared to their price in their home
market, many intricate issues are involved in estab-
lishing the price comparison. Under current U.S. law,
for example, in some circumstances a "constructed
cost" approach is used to establish the home market
price to be compared, and U.S. rules require that an
8 percent profit margin must be included in that
"price." This rule is generally regarded as a viola-
tion of U.S. obligations under the GATT and the an-
tidumping code, and as a measure that artificially in-
flates the "discovered" discrepancy between the
price of the imports in the United States and the
home market price. A number of other highly
technical benchmarks used under U.S. law also in-
flate this "margin," so that when the U.S. govern-
ment announces that imports have been found to
be "dumped," careful work with a red pencil can
lead to a different conclusion. This is not to say that
there is no dumping or no dumping problem. It is
only to say that the issues are complex and not in-
ternationally agreed upon and that statements of
"unfair dumping" need to be evaluated in the con--
text of the real objectives of those who are speaking.
Another example is the troublesome subject of for-
eign subsidies that benefit imported goods. State-
ments about unfair trade and the level playing field
often condemn imports that benefit from foreign
government subsidies. A major problem, however,
is how to define subsidy. If broadly defined, the con-
cept can include roads, schools, fire and police pro-
tection, and many tax policies. If defined even
moderately broadly, subsidies would he found to
benefit virtually all imports. and an expansive coun-
tervailing duty policy would defeat the purpose of
much of the GATT's 40 years of trade liberalization.
Fortunately, the U.S. government (so far the only
government that makes major use of antisubsidy
countervailing duties) follows concepts derived from
statutory language that tend to exclude from a defini-
tion of subsidies for countervailing duties most of
the generalized government practices found in all
societies. But these concepts are under attack by
various interests and are being narrowed by the
courts. In addition, the U.S. government professes
to be unable to take into account in a countervail-
ing duty case that it sometimes subsidizes goods in
the same manner as foreign governments. U.S.
domestic competing goods sometimes benefit from
government subsidies in this country. For those truly
seeking a level playing field, it can be argued that
when a countervailing duty is set on imported goods,
it should be reduced by the amount that represents
the subsidies benefiting U.S. domestic products. This
would equalize the subsidy effect for imports and
domestic goods, allowing them to compete on the
level playing field. Yet no one seriously thinks that
U.S. law will be changed to follow that approach.
Section 301 authorizes the President to take
various trade actions against foreign nations that
engage in "unjust" or "unfair" actions affecting U.S.
commerce. The very broad language of this law car-
ries the potential of abuse, although in general the
U.S. government seems to have exercised these
powers in a restrained and responsible manner. The
basic problem, once again, is that often there is no
international agreement on what is unfair. The
United States has pursued 301 cases to persuade
foreign governments to cease actions that only the
United States has officially deemed to be unfair. This
self-defining power of "policeman for the world"
approach has its costs and raises complex questions
about the potential of changes that might be made
to this law. On the other hand, it must be recognized
that many issues raised by the United States in the
context of a 301 case should engage the construc-
tive attention of the GATT and other international
processes-and they unfortunately have failed to do
so. Responsible U.S. action under 301, deferring to
existing international rules or encouraging other na-
tions to help develop new responsible rules, is
perhaps one of the more creative challenges for U.S.
trade policy. Indeed, Section 301 represents a unique
new approach to age-old international law doctrines
of "diplomatic protection," and has to some extent
now been emulated b)y the European Economic
Community.
THE COST OF ADJUSTMENT
Perhaps the most substantial and fundamental
policy problem of international trade today is the
question of adjustment. which is related to the sub-
ject of safeguards. Competition from many sources
for many reasons causes established producers dis-
tress. New technology can force older firms out of
business. Changes in consumer tastes, shifts in gov-
ernment procurement policies and natural disasters
can all play a similar role. In addition, foreign pro-
duction benefiting from comparative advantages can
likewise cause important competitive challenges for
older producers. These circumstances force older
producers to "adjust": either become more com-
petitive or leave that line of business. Adjustment has
a cost, and while the consumers or downstream
users of the product may benefit, the producers may
experience a concentration of distress that evokes
sympathy from not only political leaders, but co-
citizens as well. The degree to which government
should come to the rescue, however, is hotly
debated. For most of the causes mentioned, econom-
ic principles accepted in the United States would lead
government to keep hands off. With respect to im-
ports-meaning "fair" imports-the situation has
traditionally been different.
The appropriate role of government to help alle-
viate concentrated distress, particularly that felt by
workers and impacted communities, is a subject that
can benefit from wiser heads than mine. The two
most prominent approaches are to slow down im-
ports (a safeguards approach) or to grant some sort
of direct aid such as adjustment assistance. The for-
rner is often more expensive than the latter, but is
relatively disguised, "off budget" and often has a dif-
fused cost. The latter has, unfortunately, appeared
not to work very well. Whether significant legislative
changes could help either of these remedies or assist
in developing new reniedies is hard to predict. Yet
it seems to be much more directly related to the real
problems of trade effects than at least some of the
manipulation concerning unfair trade practices. Con-
structive possibilities include tying escape clause im-
port relief to a reasonable plan of adjustment, with
appropriate enforcement or appraisal of the plan and
its implementation. To some this smacks too much
of industrial policy, but the existing law already has
some p~ointers in this direction. Other possibilities
rnight include increased attention to employment
search facilities, provision for developing alternative
employment opportunities in impacted com-
munities, and more attention generally to unemploy-
ment compensation and early retirement options as
well as to retraining. As unsuccessful as many of the
existing similar programs have been, it seems un-
necessary to assume that improvements would not
work better.
T he rapid advance of world economic
interdependence, new technologies and
the problem of incorporating very different
economic systems into the GATT trading system are
causing a series of new or renewed issues to push
their way into the foreground of GATT attention.
Trade in services, intellectual property protection
and government state trading enterprises are
deservedly on the agenda for the new trade round.
Each poses difficult conceptual challenges to the
existing system and will require considerable in-
genuity by the negotiators in the months and years
to come. The troublesome and now almost peren-
nial question of the adequacy of the GATT and the
GATT system cast a cloud over these subjects. The
actions of policy leaders, in and out of Congress, in
this country and many others, will shape the land-
scape for these negotiators for many years.
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